The future projected in the recently issued Project Independence Report1 calls heavily on nuclear energy. What must be done to assure that nuclear energy will play the role expected of it in these projections -i. 
barrels of oil per day equivalent. If this actually were imported oil, it would cost the United States $25 x 109 annually; and, in addition to placing enormous pressure on world oil supplies, it would cause difficulties throughout the economy.
Beyond 1985, the projections of Project Inde- pendence are less detailed. In the post-2000 period, oil and gas will be severely depleted; synthetics from coal or from shale will be needed, but probably cannot fulfill our entire demand simply because so much coal would be needed. Even if our energy demand after 1985 should increase by only 1.6 percent per year, we might use 3 x 109 tons of coal annually compared with our current 600 x 106 tons, and the quantity of coal required would continue to increase thereafter.
We understand that the future is unpredictable, that even the elaborate econometric analysis of Project Independence is fallible. Yet, however one looks at the matter, it appears that some non-fossil source must play an increasing role in our future energy system. Of the four non-fossil possibilities -geothermal, fusion, solar, and fission -geothermal appears to be rather a small 'and localized source; fusion still is faced with scientific and technological uncertainties; solar electricity is intermittent and will probably be very expensive (though solar heating and cooling may be practical rather soon); and only nuclear fission seems to have been adequately demonstrated both technically and economically. the troublesome arguments as to whether we will deplete our ore supplies or lack the required separative work capacity would thereby be alleviated. This simple argument, drawn from history, is the strongest justification for proceeding with the breeder -so that 25 years hence we shall not again be confronted with serious uncertainties.
Reactor Safety
The safety issue has both technical and non-technical components. From technology we can estimate the probabilities and consequences of a reactor accident; how much safety we want is a non-technical question. The Rasmussen study3 predicts the probability of a reactor melt-down in a 1,O00-Mwe light-water reactor to be no more than one in 17,000 per reactor per year; the probability of a fatality for 100 reactors is predicted to be around one in 300 x 106 per year; the maximum accident to a single reactor (which might occur once in a billion years) is calculated to cause about 2,300 acute deaths and 3,200 latent cancers.
Obviously, despite Rasmussen's great contributions to the methodology of probability analysis of unlikely events, there will never be a totally definitive answer to the question: How safe is a reactor? Critics of the study insist that fault-tree analysis, in principle, is inadequate or that the numbers in the analysis are incorrect. The Rasmussen study, plus our experience to date, suggests that an accident is very unlikely and that its consequences -measured objectively -are usually rather small. Nevertheless, the Rasmussen study, as do all such studies, does not eliminate the possibility of a very unlikely -almost hypotheticalaccident that would be comparable to the worst man-made disaster, but far less than natural disasters, such as the Bangladesh typhoon.
Reactor Siting
No matter what the risks of nuclear energy areand different individuals perceive them differentlythere will always be incentive to reduce these risks. The opposition to nuclear energy is hardening. A recent utility industry poll suggests that 17 percent of those questioned oppose nuclear energy, 19 percent are undecided, and 64 percent favor its development and use. There is a non-zero chance that the public will turn away from nuclear energy, that those who are intent on abolishing nuclear energy may succeed in so doing.
The major argument of those who wish to abolish nuclear energy is basically that the social institutions, the meticulous attention to detail that is demanded by nuclear energy if we are to use it extensively, is beyond man's capacity. If a serious accident should occur, the nuclear enterprise -according to its critics -would be terminated. Therefore, say the critics, it is better to halt the enterprise now when it is relatively small and not risk a shutdown of a major source of energy than to become too dependent on what some consider an undependable source of energy.
As one who has pointed out the nature of the Faustian bargain inherent in nuclear energy -that in exchange for an inexhaustible and relatively cheap source of energy, mankind commits itself to a high order of care and social stability6 -must take issue with those who conclude, as James Conant did some 20 years ago, that nuclear energy is not worth the candle,7 that the disposal of waste (to use Conant's example) poses an insoluble dilemma. First, with respect to the assessment of hazard, none can deny that nuclear energy is potentially hazardous. But even if the Rasmussen study is conceivably wrong by a factor of 1,000, and the risk of fatality per 100 reactors is one in 3 x 105 years -not one in 300 x 106 -the hazard is well below that posed by most other man-made activities. As for the disposal of wastes, the much-maligned disposal in salt of solid wastes is simply that: much maligned. In the first place, there is every reason to believe that the ceramics in which the wastes are fixed will resist corrosion by water for a very long time, even in the most unlikely event that water should reach the wastes. One can calculate that after about 600 years in the salt mine the radioactivity of the wastes is, per unit volume averaged over the entire mine, considerably less than the radioactivity associated with the original uranium ore. We tend to forget that radium occurs in nature and that radium is in some respects more hazardous than is plutonium! After 600 years or so, the net effect of processing uranium through a reactor and returning it to the ground is to reduce the hazard associated with the virgin uranium ore. My response to the nuclear abolitionists is not that we should reject nuclear energy, but rather that we must improve nuclear energy. When Ralph Nader first pointed out that automobiles cauise 50,000 deaths each year, his response was to make cars safer -not to abolish them! In the same vein, as we recognize the potential hazard of nuclear energy, we must not abolish nuclear energy; but instead we must reduce any residual potential hazard of nuclear energy.
believe we ought to re-examine our siting policy and move forward with energy centers; particularly, favor siting breeders in such energy parks. We must continue to tighten our standards of workmanship and increase our meticulous attention to detail. We should investigate schemes for removing the transuranics from wastes and for making the wastes less leachable, even though our scenarios suggest that this may not be necessary. We must also strengthen the institutions charged with responsibility for generating nuclear energy.
No one can promise that these measures will be totally successful, and that the hazard of nuclear energy will always remain potential. But we must remember that, by contrast, the dangers of fossil energy are not potential; instead, they are real. In proceeding on a nuclear course -with its economic advantageswe accept the presumptive and potential risk of nuclear energy, but we avoid other risks that are real -risks that are neither presumptive nor potential. This approach would appear to be a far more prudent course than the destruction of nuclear energy demanded by the nuclear abolitionists.
